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Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral
Humanitarian Intervention
STEFANO RECCHIA
Approval from the United Nations or NATO appears to have become
a necessary condition for US humanitarian military intervention.
Conventional explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy can-
not fully account for this given that US policymakers vary consider-
ably in their attachment to multilateralism. This article argues that
America’s military leaders, who are consistently skeptical about
humanitarian intervention and tend to emphasize its costs, play a
central role in making multilateral approval necessary. As long as
top-ranking generals express strong reservations about intervention
and no clear threat to US national security exists, they can veto the
use of force. In such circumstances, even heavyweight “humani-
tarian hawks” among the civilian leadership, who initially may
have wanted to bypass multilateral bodies to maximize US freedom
of action, can be expected to recognize the need for UN or NATO
approval—if only as a means of mollifying the generals by reas-
suring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden
sharing. Two case studies drawing on interviews with senior civil-
ian and military officials illustrate and probe the plausibility of the
argument.
In late February 2011, after Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi launched a
brutal crackdown on local insurgents, national security leaders in the Barack
Obama administration began debating the possibility of humanitarian military
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intervention. At one end of the policy spectrum were senior civilian officials
of liberal Wilsonian persuasion—including National Security Council (NSC)
staffers, Samantha Power and Benjamin Rhodes, as well as ambassador to the
United Nations, Susan Rice—who vigorously called for military action; at the
other end were secretary of defense, Robert Gates, and the top military lead-
ers who opposed intervention by highlighting attendant risks and potential
long-term operational costs.1 President Obama waited until 17 March before
deciding in favor of intervention.2 By then, NATO allies, led by Britain and
France, had pledged that they would carry most of the operation’s burden
after the initial degradation of Libyan air defenses.3 Furthermore, on that
same day, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, au-
thorizing NATO allies “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” The Libya intervention
is part of a pattern: since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
used military force for humanitarian purposes numerous times, including in
Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1994–95), and
Kosovo (1999); in each case, prior to intervention, policymakers secured
approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or NATO’s North
Atlantic Council (NAC), as well as concrete burden-sharing commitments
from international partners.
Securing UNSC or NAC approval is often time consuming; it constrains
US freedom of action; it may require substantial side payments and logrolling;
and it entails a loss of secrecy and thus typically eliminates the element of
surprise. Policymakers can therefore be expected to seek such approval only
if they anticipate that the benefits will outweigh the costs. The conventional
wisdom is that US civilian leaders have either internalized or at any rate feel
bound by norms of legitimate behavior, which demand that “in situations
other than self-defense, decisions to use force must be made multilater-
ally.”4 However, standard explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy
norms cannot fully account for why the approval of standing international
1 Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 44–53; Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New
York: Knopf, 2014), 511–12; Karen De Young and Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Defense Leaders Warn of Risks
in Enforcing No-Fly- Zone,” Washington Post, 2 March 2011.
2 Gates, Duty, 518; Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Obama’s Shift Toward Military Action,”
Washington Post, 19 March 2011.
3 When NATO took over command and control of the mission on 31 March, Gates declared before
Congress that “this transition was part of the package and part of the plan with our allies, from day one.”
Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation in Libya. Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
112th Congress, 12 (31 March 2011) (statement of Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defense).
4 Christian Reus-Smit, “Liberal Hierarchy and the License to Use Force,” in Force and Legitimacy in
World Politics, ed. David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 71. See also Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Between a New World Order and None: Explaining the
Reemergence of the United Nations in World Politics,” in Critical Security Studies, ed. Keith Krause and
Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of
Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 80–82;
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organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO has apparently become a nec-
essary condition for US humanitarian military intervention. Policymakers in
the United States vary considerably in their attachment to multilateralism and
consequently in the degree to which they are willing to accept potentially
costly constraints on US freedom of action for the sake of IO legitimation.
Civilian policymakers who view humanitarian intervention as a matter
of urgency (I call them “humanitarian hawks”) often do not feel bound by
norms requiring IO approval. When confronted with humanitarian crises
abroad involving mass atrocities, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing, and when
international partners do not share the same sense of urgency, the human-
itarian hawks may initially be inclined to bypass multilateral bodies such
as the UNSC and NATO’s NAC to ensure swift military action. More dovish
policymakers can be expected to place greater importance on IO approval,
as a source of legitimacy and a catalyst for domestic and international sup-
port. Yet among US civilian leaders, the interventionist hawks tend to carry
disproportionate weight: in the face of a worsening humanitarian situation,
they have common morality on their side, and they can appeal to America’s
sense of exceptionalism and unique responsibility. Furthermore, the civil-
ian doves may lack the professional expertise to effectively challenge the
hawks’ optimistic assessment about the risks and likely operational costs of
intervention.
It is in this context that the top-ranking generals and admirals play an
important restraining role. Senior US military officers are consistently more
skeptical than civilian policymakers about deploying American forces abroad
for human rights–related purposes.5 As the prospect of intervention becomes
increasingly real, top-level military leaders—the chairman and vice chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the commanders of the unified combatant
commands, and senior officers on the Joint Staff—typically request clear ob-
jectives, a viable exit strategy, and assurances that the operational burden
will be shared with international partners.6 Because of their informational ad-
vantage and the military’s high standing in American society, these top-level
officers wield an extraordinary amount of influence over decisions regarding
armed intervention. As long as they express strong reservations, and the civil-
ian leadership is divided over whether to intervene (which is likely absent
Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
5 Ole R. Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at
the Start of the New Millennium,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap in American National
Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 34–46; Peter D.
Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of
Force (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 2.
6 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 36–38, 84–87; Thomas Szayna et al., The Civil-Military Gap
in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 101–3. See
also Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), chap. 9.
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clear threats to US national security), they can tilt the bureaucratic balance
of power toward nonintervention, thus vetoing the use of force.7 In such
circumstances, even the most heavyweight humanitarian hawks among the
civilian leadership are likely to come to recognize the need for UN or NATO
approval—if only as a means of mollifying the senior military officers by
reassuring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden sharing.
My argument is not that the uniformed leaders’ role is always decisive in
steering US policy on humanitarian intervention toward the UNSC or NATO’s
NAC. Civilian policymakers may have other, independent motives for seek-
ing IO approval—whether complying with international norms, reducing
international opposition, or increasing US public support for intervention.8
However, the central hypothesis of this article is that, perhaps counterintu-
itively, military leaders constitute the ultimate bulwark against US unilateral
humanitarian intervention. The uniformed leaders are likely to play a partic-
ularly salient role in multilateralizing coercive humanitarian operations that
aim to resolve a humanitarian crisis at its roots. Given the difficulties of
securing IO approval for such intrusive missions, hawkish civilian officials
may at first be especially tempted to bypass multilateral bodies altogether;
however, those are precisely the types of interventions that the American
military is most likely to oppose in the absence of credible assurances about
sustained multilateral burden sharing.
Scholarship on civil-military relations has long emphasized that, al-
though US generals and admirals are reluctant to intervene abroad in pursuit
of internal political change absent clear threats to national security, when
the civilian leadership orders them to do so, their preference is for de-
ploying “overwhelming force” with as much autonomy as possible.9 One
7 Deborah D. Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the US Military is Averse
to Responding to Post-Cold War Low-Level Threats,” Security Studies 2, no. 2 (Winter 1996–97): 51–90;
Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
22–33; Andrew J. Bacevich, “Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of US Civil-Military Relations Since World War
II,” in The Long War: A New History of US National Security Policy Since World War II , ed. Bacevich (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 248–49.
8 On how IO approval may help reduce international opposition to US policies, see Erik Voeten,
“The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” International
Organization 59, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 527–57; Alexander Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs: The
Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter
2006): 1–34; Joel H. Westra, “Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of
International Order,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 513–33. On IO approval
as a means to increase US public support, see especially Joseph M. Grieco et al., “Let’s Get a Second
Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War,” International Studies Quarterly
55, no. 2 (June 2011): 563–83; Terrence L. Chapman, Securing Approval: Domestic Politics andMultilateral
Authorization for Force (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 66–79; Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold
War Crises, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); David H. Petraeus, “Military Influence
and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force,” Armed Forces & Society 15, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 490–93; Feaver
and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, 43–53.
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might infer from this that senior officers should be suspicious of multilateral
constraints. During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur in fact be-
moaned “United Nations restrictions,” complaining that they made it more
difficult for the United States to employ force effectively and decisively.10
More recently, uniformed leaders have been wary of deploying US troops
under foreign command and subjecting them to international jurisdiction.11
However, America’s senior officers ultimately appear to be pragmatists on
the question of multilateralism, and there is evidence that on average they
value international cooperation through bodies like the UN or NATO more
than civilian leaders.12
This article proceeds in four parts. The first part highlights the burden-
sharing benefits of IO approval and clarifies why civilian policymakers vary
in their cost-benefit analysis vis-a`-vis multilateralism. The second part dis-
cusses the senior military’s skepticism about humanitarian intervention and
related demand for burden sharing and exit strategies. The third part theo-
rizes how the military’s reluctance to intervene makes IO approval necessary
and elaborates on the circumstances under which the military’s role is likely
to be particularly salient. The final part traces the process of US decision
making on the Haiti (1993–94) and Kosovo (1998–99) interventions, drawing
on dozens of interviews with senior civilian and military officials, in order to
illustrate and probe the plausibility of the argument.
IO APPROVAL FOR SUSTAINED BURDEN SHARING
Advance approval from the UNSC or NAC legitimizes US military intervention
and helps the United States signal benign intentions to foreign audiences.
That reduces international opposition, making it easier for the leaders of
third-party states to cooperate actively with the United States by offering
landing and basing rights or contributing troops and resources.13 Although
only a few major allies possess the ability to substantially contribute to US-
led combat operations in terms of advanced warfighting capabilities, many
more foreign partners possess the more basic capabilities required for burden
sharing on postwar stabilization and reconstruction. The legitimation effect
of IO approval, however, may be insufficient by itself to ensure sustained
10 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: Ishi Press, 2010), 372. See also William Manchester,
American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964 (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008), 637, 667.
11 Sarah B. Sewall, “Multilateral Peace Operations,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy, ed.
Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 191–224.
12 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 36–38; Szayna et al., Civil-Military Gap, 101–3. See also
Betts, American Force, 208–11.
13 Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs.” See also Jennifer Welsh, “Authorizing Humanitarian Inter-
vention,” in The United Nations and Global Security, ed. Richard Price and Mark Zacher (New York:
Palgrave, 2004); Chapman, Securing Approval, chap. 5.
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international burden sharing following the end of major combat. This is
when multilateral pledges of support and their reputational implications be-
come relevant. First, the resolution authorizing military intervention, typically
a UNSC mandate, may commit the multilateral body to set up a follow-on
peacekeeping force led by other international partners. For instance, Security
Council (SC) Resolution 940, which authorized the 1994 intervention in Haiti,
explicitly mandated the establishment of a follow-on UN force as soon as
basic security in the country had been restored.14 Consequently, half a year
after the initial intervention, the United States was able to hand off peace-
keeping responsibilities to a six-thousand-strong UN mission, composed of
a majority of non-US troops.15 Similarly, SC Resolution 1497, authorizing a
US-led intervention in Liberia in 2003, included a commitment on the part of
the Security Council “to establish . . . a follow-on United Nations stabilization
force” under regional leadership (i.e., led by countries other than the United
States) within a maximum of two months.16 This mode of proceeding is par-
ticularly attractive for lower-stakes humanitarian missions, in which reliance
on less proficient troops from developing countries appears acceptable for
keeping the peace.17
Second, the burden-sharing commitment may be less formal. A SC res-
olution authorizing the use of “all necessary means” involves a public, and
therefore potentially costly, commitment to support US policy on the part
of all those council members who have offered their affirmative vote. The
same goes for approval from NATO’s NAC, which requires a consensus
among all members of the alliance. Once member states are thus committed
to supporting US policy, they are less likely to subsequently resist the es-
tablishment of UN or NATO stabilization missions. Countries other than the
United States may also independently value institutions such as the UN and
NATO for the security benefits they provide. Consequently, once a UN or
NATO stabilization mission has been approved and the IO’s reputation be-
comes linked to mission success, member states may be willing to maintain
significant troop contributions even in the face of mounting costs. Approval
of US-led interventions by NATO’s NAC, in particular, substantially increases
Washington’s ability to extract sustained burden-sharing contributions from
its most militarily capable allies. As former NATO secretary-general Jaap de
14 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 940, “UN Mission in Haiti,” 31 July 1994, par. 8.
15 David M. Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990–1997
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 7.
16 SC, Resolution 1497, “Liberia,” 1 August 2003, par. 2.
17 SC, Resolution 2085, authorizing a French intervention in Mali in 2012, followed the same pattern
in mandating the establishment of a follow-on stabilization mission made up largely of African troops.
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Hoop Scheffer explains, “The sense of keeping one’s obligations and com-
mitments to other allies, upon whom one’s own security ultimately depends,
is a powerful motive for equitable burden-sharing.”18
In the Balkans, for instance, where the United States intervened in 1995
and again in 1999 only after securing IO approval, Washington’s European
partners have remained committed to the success of NATO operations that
they supported from the outset and have taken on increasingly greater shares
of the stabilization and reconstruction burden.19 By contrast, should the
United States launch military interventions that are not clearly in self-defense
without UN or NATO approval, any support that it may be able to elicit
from improvised coalitions of the willing is likely to be fickle and short-
lived. The American and British experience in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 is
an eloquent case in point. After the 2003 invasion, launched without IO
approval, Washington and London struggled to persuade other countries to
contribute stabilization troops. Once the United States agreed to offset part
of the financial costs of those contributions, in the short run, it was able to
recruit about sixteen thousand troops from partners other than Britain.20 But
the improvised coalition showed little staying power, disintegrating as the
operation became protracted and casualties mounted. By May 2007, when
America surged its own troops to more than one hundred fifty thousand at
the height of the Iraqi civil war, the non-US, non-UK component had shrunk
to only about seven thousand troops, making up less than five percent of
the total international force.21
Policymakers’ Differing Cost-Benefit Analyses
In an important contribution to theory, Sarah Kreps argues that two factors
determine whether the United States seeks multilateral approval for military
intervention: (1) its time horizon, as determined by the overall sense of
18 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Project Syndicate, 18 June 2008, http://www.project-syndicate.org/
columnist/jaap-d–scheffer. See also Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion:
Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6,
no. 3 (July 2010): 191–215.
19 Steven Woehrel, “Future of the Balkans and US Policy Concerns,” CRS Report for Congress (Wash-
ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 9–13; Stefano Recchia, “Beyond International Trustee-
ship: EU Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Occasional Paper No. 66 (Paris: EU Institute for
Security Studies, 2007).
20 Paul Richter, “US Enlists More Countries in Iraq, at Taxpayers’ Expense,” Los Angeles Times, 22
June 2003. See also Randall Newnham, “‘Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?’ US Economic Linkage and
the Iraq War Coalition,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 2 (May 2008): 183–200.
21 Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments. Hear-
ings before the House Subcommittee on IOs, Human Rights, and Oversight, 110th Cong., 5–8 (9 May 2007)
(statement of Joseph A. Christoff, director, International Affairs and Trade, US Government Accountability
Office). See also Christopher M. Blanchard and Catherine Marie Dale, “Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Stabilization and Reconstruction,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2007), 11–18.
258 S. Recchia
urgency and (2) the anticipated operational commitment, “which refers to the
level of resources directed toward the particular intervention.”22 When time
horizons are long, reflecting low urgency, and the United States anticipates
a significant operational commitment, multilateralism will seem attractive “as
a way to reassure other states [and] share . . . costly burdens.” Conversely,
when time horizons are short, reflecting a strong sense of urgency (based
on the perception that important American interests are threatened), and
the United States “thinks it can win quickly or on the cheap, . . . there will
be fewer incentives to aggregate resources,” and we can expect a unilateral
course of action. Kreps argues that time horizons as determined by sense
of urgency “tend to dominate” because a high sense of urgency reduces
concerns about operational commitment.23
Sometimes the value of the variables identified by Kreps may be so ob-
vious that policymakers quickly reach a consensus on whether the longer-
term burden-sharing benefits of securing IO approval are likely to outweigh
short-term freedom of action costs. Perhaps more often than not, however,
decision makers debating the merits of intervention under the pressure of
rapidly evolving circumstances differ significantly in their sense of urgency
and their expectation of the likely operational commitment.24 As Stephen
Brooks notes, since the sense of urgency and consequently “the discount
rate may vary from one policy maker to another in ways that cannot be
explained simply by looking at the objective nature of the security envi-
ronment,” policymakers’ cost-benefit analysis vis-a`-vis multilateralism is also
likely to vary. This leads Brooks to conclude that “more research is needed
on this topic.”25
CIVILIAN HUMANITARIAN HAWKS VERSUS MILITARY DOVES
Humanitarian and other human rights–related interventions typically reflect
classical liberal-internationalist, or Wilsonian, beliefs in individual freedom,
self-government, and national self-determination.26 Accordingly, within the
22 Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31, 28–33, more generally.
23 Ibid., 35, 33, 34.
24 For instance, there was no consensus among US leaders as to whether the 1994 Haitian governance
and refugee crisis, the large-scale ethnic violence in the Balkans following the breakup of Yugoslavia,
or even Iraq’s suspected WMD proliferation around the turn of the millennium required urgent military
action.
25 Stephen Brooks, “Review of Sarah Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Inter-
ventions After the Cold War,” H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable 4, no. 7 (2012): 7.
26 Michael W. Doyle, The Question of Intervention (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015),
chap. 4; Stefano Recchia, “The Origins of Liberal Wilsonianism,” in Just and Unjust Military Intervention:
European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill, ed. Recchia and Jennifer Welsh (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
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executive branch, civilian policymakers of liberal Wilsonian persuasion as
well as their neoconservative kin (usually officials from the State Department
and the staff of the National Security Council) tend to push most strongly for
humanitarian military intervention.27 Liberal Wilsonianism is sympathetic to
international institutions in the abstract, while neoconservatism is ideolog-
ically inimical to most forms of multilateral cooperation.28 However, those
principled differences between liberal Wilsonians and neoconservatives fre-
quently disappear when they are confronted with large-scale human rights
violations abroad that involve mass atrocities, war crimes, or ethnic cleans-
ing. In such circumstances, liberal and neoconservative humanitarian hawks
can be expected to agree that unless IO approval is readily available with
few strings attached, the short-term costs of forging a multilateral consen-
sus in terms of reduced US policy flexibility will outweigh any longer-term
benefits.
First, from a moral standpoint, the interventionist hawks are likely to
view military action to relieve the suffering as legitimate, regardless of mul-
tilateral approval. Indeed, prominent liberal theorists of humanitarian inter-
vention note that “morality . . . is not a bar to unilateral action.”29 Second,
the interventionists are likely to focus primarily on the anticipated payoffs
of swift military action and downplay attendant risks and (long-term) op-
erational costs. As former secretary of defense Robert Gates notes, civilian
policymakers “considering military intervention . . . [at first] virtually never
consider the cost.”30 That presumably makes the burden-sharing benefits
of IO approval less appealing in their eyes. Finally, in terms of generating
and sustaining US domestic support for intervention, hawkish policymakers
generally tend to emphasize the importance of decisive leadership and bold
initiatives rather than multilateral approval.31
27 See Robert DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). For a more critical perspective, see also Tony Smith,
America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, exp. ed. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2012).
28 Michael Joseph Smith, “Liberalism and International Reform,” in Traditions of International Ethics,
ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 215–18; Stefan
Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
29 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 107. See also Fernando
Teso´n, “The moral basis of humanitarian intervention revisited,” in The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention, ed. Don E. Scheid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
30 Gates, Duty, 519. See also Stephen Wertheim, “A Solution from Hell: The United States and the
Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, nos. 3–4 (December 2010):
149–72; Aaron Rapport, “The Long and Short of It: Cognitive Constraints on Leaders’ Assessments of
‘Postwar’ Iraq,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 133–71.
31 Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force
in American Foreign Policy,” in The New American Interventionism, ed. Demetrios P. Caralay (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 10; Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and
Leadership in Wartime (New York: Penguin, 2002), 229.
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Partially because of their steadfast commitment to their cause, the hu-
manitarian hawks tend to be very influential in related policy debates. Ar-
guments in favor of humanitarian intervention also mesh well with Amer-
ica’s sense of exceptionalism and unique moral responsibility, which can be
expected to further empower the hawks.32 Other, more dovish civilian pol-
icymakers are usually more concerned about the operational commitment,
and consequently they may view the longer-term burden-sharing benefits
of securing IO approval as outweighing short-term freedom-of-action costs.
However, in the face of a worsening humanitarian situation, the hawks are
likely to be able to draw effectively on common morality, shocking imagery,
and historical analogies (e.g., the Holocaust or the more recent genocide
in Rwanda) to push the United States toward military action. Furthermore,
dovish civilian officials may lack the technical expertise to credibly chal-
lenge the hawks’ feasibility studies and related optimistic assessments about
the risks and likely costs of intervention. That is where the American military,
with its consistent skepticism about humanitarian intervention, its acknowl-
edged professional expertise, and its high standing in American society, plays
a central and hitherto underappreciated role in steering US policy toward
multilateralism.
The Senior Officers’ Skepticism about Humanitarian Intervention
Top-level generals and admirals, led by the JCS chairman and vice-chairman,
are consistently among the most reluctant doves in US policy debates about
humanitarian intervention. They worry more than most civilian officials about
operational costs and potential pitfalls down the road. The military’s dovish
attitude appears to be the result of a combination of ideological preferences,
organizational interests, and lessons learned from history.
Samuel Huntington famously noted that military leaders tend to be con-
servative political realists in foreign affairs.33 That insight has been confirmed
with regard to the United States by survey research carried out under the
auspices of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS).34 As conserva-
tive realists, America’s military officers usually conceive of national security
in terms of traditional realpolitik goals (control of territory, maintenance of
geostrategic access and position, and defense of major allies) and are more
skeptical of humanitarian and other human rights–driven policies than most
civilian leaders—especially those without military experience.35 According
32 See Stanley Hoffmann, “American Exceptionalism: The New Version,” in American Exceptionalism
and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
33 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 59–65.
34 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 32–34; Szayna et al., Civil-Military Gap, 86.
35 TISS data indicates that 34 percent of civilian leaders with no military experience view “promoting
and defending human rights in other countries” as a “very important” US policy goal, while only 13
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to TISS data, less than five percent of uniformed leaders view the use of
force “to address humanitarian needs abroad” as a “very important” role for
the US military, compared to almost twenty percent of non-veteran civilian
leaders who view that same goal as “very important.”36 Evidence from other
sources also indicates that members of the armed services are generally sus-
picious of claims about American exceptionalism and significantly less likely
than non-veteran civilians to view armed intervention as a viable means of
changing the domestic politics of foreign countries.37
Parochial organizational interests further magnify the military’s reluc-
tance to intervene for humanitarian purposes abroad. The senior uniformed
officers who participate in policy debates about armed intervention rise to
their position through the ranks of their services; consequently, they tend
to be more parochial in outlook than civilian appointees who may join an
administration from the private sector or civil society.38 As parochial career
officials, the generals and admirals want to preserve the health, vitality, and
social prestige of their organization. They worry that if the United States
intervenes out of a momentary urge to “do something” without a national
consensus that important American interests are at stake, it will be difficult to
maintain domestic support for the mission, with potentially high long-term
costs for the services and their troops. As General David Petraeus notes, “It is,
after all, the senior military’s institutions—the services to which the officers
have devoted their lives—that have the most to risk in foreign intervention.”39
Finally, the senior officers’ views on armed intervention and their con-
cerns about maintaining domestic support for potentially open-ended de-
ployments reflect the traumatic experience of America’s war in Vietnam.
As that war became protracted, Congress eventually cut off funding for all
American troops after a set deadline, forcing a humiliating withdrawal.40
The military’s “lessons of Vietnam” are concisely summarized in what has
percent of active-duty military officers agree. See, for example, Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,”
35; Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, 37–38.
36 The views of civilian leaders with military experience are closer to those of active-duty military
officers: only about 10 percent of them rate the goal as “very important.” See, for example, Holsti, “Of
Chasms and Convergences,” 46; Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, 46–47.
37 Pew Social and Democratic Trends, War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: The Military-Civilian
Gap (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 5 October 2011), 22–26. For evidence that policymakers
without prior combat experience tend to be more hawkish, see also Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C.
Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International
Organization 68, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 527–59.
38 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 40; Szayna et al., Civil-Military Gap, 68.
39 Petraeus, “Military Influence,” 498. For an alternative view, which traces the cautious nature of
US military officers back to the American tradition of strong civilian control and the related ability of
civilian leaders to punish officers for botched military interventions, see Tood S. Sechser, “Are Soldiers
Less War-Prone than Statesmen?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (October 2004): 746–74.
40 Richard Grimmett, “Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving US Military Forces
and Overseas Deployments,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2007), 2–3.
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become known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine on the use of American
force. The doctrine, which continues to enjoy widespread support among se-
nior military officers, holds among other things that the United States should
intervene only as a last resort, when “vital” American interests are threat-
ened, when there is “reasonable assurance” that Congress and the American
public will be supportive, and when policymakers have identified a clear
exit strategy.41 The most consistently cautious about armed intervention and
humanitarian intervention in particular have been generals in the US Army
and Marine Corps, given that their services typically bear the greatest burden
in terms of ground combat, logistics, and long-term stabilization.42
Demand for Burden Sharing and Exit Strategies
America’s top-level military officers can be expected to acquiesce to a pro-
posed humanitarian intervention, if they believe that the risk to US forces will
be minimized (e.g., by relying exclusively on airpower during the active com-
bat phase) and that US forces will not carry the main burden—particularly
for “postcombat” stabilization missions where success is notoriously elusive.
The senior officers’ preference for burden sharing on peacekeeping and sta-
bilization follows naturally from their concerns about the operational costs
of intervention and related worries about US domestic support. General John
Abizaid, formerly director of the Joint Staff and commander of Central Com-
mand, summarizes the military’s view as follows: “American troops are best
employed when decisive military force needs to be applied, but as combat
operations are over and you move toward stabilization, the force structure
should be increasingly international.”43 In line with that, the Pentagon’s 2012
strategic guidance document and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,
both of which reflect the military’s concerns, put strong emphasis on inter-
national burden sharing for peacekeeping and stability operations overseas.44
Survey research further indicates that a majority of US military officers
believe it is appropriate for the uniformed leaders to “insist” on the need
for an exit strategy vis-a`-vis civilian authorities.45 General Colin Powell, with
whom the notion of an exit strategy is now commonly associated, interprets
41 Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,” Political Science
Quarterly 124, no. 10 (Spring 2009): 71–93. For evidence of the doctrine’s continuing popularity among
senior military officers, see Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, 50–53; Szayna et al., Civil-Military
Gap, 141–45.
42 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 116–22; Petraeus, “Military Influence,” 497.
43 Gen. John P. Abizaid (Joint Staff director, 2001–2, and CENTCOM Commander, 2003–7), interview
by author, 20 January 2011.
44 US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century
(Washington, DC, 5 January 2012); US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Wash-
ington, DC, 4 March 2014).
45 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 87.
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it as meaning that before American troops are committed abroad “you better
think through how it ends and what happens at the end.”46 Particularly in the
context of humanitarian intervention, the US exit strategy has increasingly
consisted in handing off longer-term peacekeeping and stabilization tasks to
follow-on UN or NATO missions, with the majority of troops contributed by
other international partners. A recent US Army field manual accordingly notes
that officers planning a humanitarian intervention should aim to “accomplish
transfer of authority [to follow-on multilateral missions] as early as possible.
The timing of the transfer [ought to be] part of the initial negotiations.”47
America’s military leaders clearly understand that IO involvement can
help legitimate the use of force and facilitate burden sharing, as evidenced
by the fact that close to eighty percent of military officers emphasize the need
to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes.48 That
said, top-level generals and admirals are unlikely to recommend explicitly
that the United States seek approval from the UNSC or NAC before inter-
vening. The standard view among senior military officers, as General Powell
explains, is that whether the United States seeks IO approval “is a political
matter, and it is up to the political leadership to ultimately decide it.”49 What
the uniformed leaders are likely to request is some reassurance that large
numbers of American troops will not be deployed in costly peacekeeping
and stabilization missions for the indefinite future, particularly when they
believe that no important US national interests are involved.50
IO APPROVAL TO REASSURE AND MOLLIFY THE MILITARY
Senior military officers are not the only US national security leaders who
can be expected to emphasize the operational costs and potential pitfalls of
humanitarian intervention. Risk-averse doves among the civilian leadership,
especially war veterans and others with significant ties to the armed services,
might express similar concerns. Indeed, civilian Pentagon officials usually
underscore the military’s concerns in the interagency debate. However, the
uniformed leaders, because of their acknowledged professional expertise
and preeminent role in the planning and execution of military operations,
have a unique ability to effectively highlight the risks and likely operational
46 Gen. Colin L. Powell (US national security adviser, 1987–89; JCS chairman, 1989–93; and US
secretary of state, 2001–5), interview by author, 2 February 2011.
47 US Department of the Army, “The Army in Multinational Operations,” FM 3–16 (8 April 2014),
chap. 5, §14.
48 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 36–38. See also Szayna et al., Civil-Military Gap, 101–3.
49 Powell, interview; confirmed by Abizaid, interview.
50 At a lower level, senior military planners on the Joint Staff and at the regional combatant commands
(especially the J-5 directors for strategic plans and policy) might go further, de facto advising that the
United States intervene only with IO approval when they explicitly foresee it in their recommended
options for the president.
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costs of intervention. The military’s high standing in American society further
magnifies the senior officers’ leverage.
The Senior Officers’ Leverage
Senior military officers can rely on their professional expertise and related
informational advantage to portray some solutions as impractical. If the gen-
erals disagree with a specific use-of-force option, they can artificially inflate
the required troop numbers and anticipated casualties to make it appear
politically unfeasible. As former national security adviser Anthony Lake ex-
plains, when the “senior military guys are saying, ‘This mission can’t be
done,’ it’s hard to say, ‘Listen, you professionals, here’s an amateur’s view of
how and why it can be done.’”51 The generals’ informational advantage has
probably never been greater, given that the number of civilian government
officials with military experience has been steadily decreasing.52
But top-level military leaders can also act as more straightforwardly
political players. At a time of generally declining popular support for pub-
lic institutions in the United States, including Congress and the presidency,
Americans continue to express high levels of confidence in the armed ser-
vices.53 Consequently, by opposing a particular policy in private and even
just hinting at the possibility that they might openly voice their disagreements
with the civilian leadership, the generals can wield significant influence over
military intervention decision making—especially when the policy is already
domestically controversial.54
To further increase their leverage, the uniformed leaders might surrep-
titiously leak their reservations to the media, openly express their concerns
about the risks and operational costs of intervention during press confer-
ences and public congressional hearings, and even threaten their resignation
as a last resort.55 So long as the civilian principals are divided over how to
proceed (and particularly as long as the secretary of defense sides with the
uniformed leaders), a JCS chairman or regional combatant commander who
openly expresses the military’s concerns faces a low probability of being
51 Quoted in Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, 3rd ed. (New
York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 316.
52 See Mark Thompson, “The other 1%,” Time, 21 November 2011, 34–39. On the military’s informa-
tional advantage and its implications, see also Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 68–70.
53 According to a 2014 Gallup poll, 74 percent of Americans have confidence in the military, 29%
percent in the presidency, and a record-low 7 percent in Congress. Gallup, “Confidence in Institutions,”
public opinion poll, 5–8 June 2014.
54 Risa Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies,” in American Civil-Military Relations,
ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 232–33;
Bacevich, “Elusive Bargain,” 247–49.
55 Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity,” 219–20; Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises,
43–45.
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punished by the president for speaking out.56 Even if the senior generals
do not aim to undermine administration policy, their public expressions of
concern in response to questions from journalists or members of Congress
are likely to have that effect in practice: recent survey research indicates
that perceived military opposition to proposed uses of force has a significant
negative effect on US public support for intervention, reducing that support
by seven percentage points on average.57
In short, as long as the top-ranking uniformed leaders remain opposed
and civilian authorities are themselves divided over whether to intervene
(which is likely for humanitarian crises that do not clearly threaten US na-
tional security), “the military [has the ability to] exercise a veto over the use
of American force.”58 Under such circumstances, the civilian interventionists
need to be able to reassure the military establishment, or at least demon-
strate that the military’s concerns have been adequately addressed, in order
to keep the use of force on the agenda and gradually shift the bureaucratic
balance of power in favor of intervention.
Overcoming the Generals’ Veto
Confronted with a military veto of a proposed humanitarian intervention,
hawkish civilian policymakers face an uphill bureaucratic battle. At a min-
imum, they need to get the generals to no longer explicitly oppose the
intervention. To that end, the civilian hawks, who are likely to have ini-
tially focused primarily on the expected payoffs of their preferred course of
action, need to grapple with operational details to a much greater degree.
“The military are very good at making the civilian leadership think all the way
down the line in the interagency discussions and helping them understand
the implications of their actions,” explains Donald Kerrick, a former deputy
US national security adviser.59 In the course of the resulting back-and-forth
debate between senior military officers and civilian leaders, even the most
hawkish civilians are likely to have to acknowledge that a resource-intensive
and potentially open-ended troop commitment may be necessary to achieve
US strategic objectives and that maintaining congressional support will be
difficult in the absence of sustained burden sharing.
Ultimately, to win the bureaucratic battle, the civilian interventionists
need to be able to make a persuasive case that the use of force is a last
56 Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?” esp. 56–59; Feaver, Armed Servants, 87–90.
57 Jim Golby, Kyle Dropp, and Peter Feaver, “Listening to the Generals: How Military Advice Affects
Public Support for the Use of Force” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, April 2013).
58 Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military,” Naval War College Review 55,
no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15. See also Avant, “Reluctant Warriors,” 58–59; Desch, Civilian Control of the
Military, 22–33; Bacevich, “Elusive Bargain,” 248–49.
59 Lt. Gen. Donald L. Kerrick (NSC director of European affairs, 1994–95, and deputy assistant to the
president for national security affairs, 1997–99), interview by author, 22 March 2010.
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resort, the objectives of military action are clearly and narrowly defined,
international partners support the policy and are willing to shoulder a signif-
icant portion of the longer-term burden, and a viable exit strategy exists for
American forces. As a result, even the most determined humanitarian hawks,
who at first may have wanted to bypass the United Nations and NATO
to maximize US freedom of action, can be expected to update their cost-
benefit analysis vis-a`-vis multilateralism. The hawks will reluctantly come to
agree with the doves that delaying US military action, accepting potentially
cumbersome multilateral coordination, and even offering side-payments to
recalcitrant IO member states may be worthwhile and perhaps necessary
in order to secure UN or NATO approval and reassure the generals about
longer-term burden sharing. Securing IO approval by itself may be insuffi-
cient to mollify a reluctant military leadership; but such approval, combined
with a narrowly defined mission and concrete pledges of operational sup-
port from international partners, can be expected to reduce the military’s
opposition to a point where the president may feel comfortable taking a
final decision to intervene.
The uniformed leaders are likely to play a particularly salient role in
multilateralizing coercive humanitarian missions that aim to resolve a human-
itarian crisis at its roots by forcibly changing the domestic authority structure
of the target state. Such coercive missions are in tension with the principle
of noninterference in states’ domestic affairs, as enshrined in Article 2 of the
UN Charter. Consequently, there are good reasons to expect that emerging
powers such as China, Russia, India, and Brazil (who are attached to tra-
ditionalist interpretations of state sovereignty), as well as America’s closest
European allies (whose domestic audiences attach great value to compli-
ance with UN Charter law), will be reluctant to offer their affirmative vote at
the UNSC or NAC.60 As the difficulties of securing multilateral approval be-
come apparent, civilian policymakers in Washington who strongly advocate
the use of force for internal political change may at first be especially inclined
to bypass the UN and NATO. Such coercive humanitarian missions, however,
are also the types of intervention about which the American military has the
greatest reservations, given the likelihood of open-ended commitments with
dwindling US domestic support. The military’s role then becomes central in
multilateralizing those particular types of interventions: the generals’ fear of
costly quagmires and their threat to veto such interventions altogether can
motivate even heavyweight humanitarian hawks to make the extra effort
needed to secure multilateral approval.
60 On emerging powers’ traditionalist interpretation of sovereignty, see Oliver Stuenkel, “The BRICS
and the Future of R2P,” Global Responsibility to Protect 6, no. 1 (January 2014): 3–28. On the Euro-
peans’ attachment to UN Charter law, see Joachim Krause, “Multilateralism: Behind European Views,”
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2004): 43–59.
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Securing UN or NATO approval is usually less challenging for more
limited, less intrusive humanitarian operations aimed at protecting popula-
tions under threat of attack and/or facilitating the delivery of emergency
assistance. In those latter cases, US policymakers can be expected to readily
agree that the limited international negotiations required to secure IO ap-
proval are worthwhile, and consequently the military’s role in persuading
civilian authorities to seek IO approval will be less salient. Summing up,
the uniformed leaders’ role in steering US humanitarian intervention policy
toward the UNSC or NAC is likely to become more central as the intrusive-
ness of a planned operation increases and securing IO approval accordingly
becomes more difficult.
CIVIL-MILITARY BARGAINING ON HAITI AND KOSOVO
During the debates about US military intervention in Haiti (1993–94) and
Kosovo (1998–99), some of the most senior US civilian policymakers per-
sistently advocated a swift use of force aimed at internal political change
(restoring an ousted head of state in the first case and enforcing ethnic mi-
nority rights in the latter). Other IO member states were hesitant on both
occasions to offer their affirmative vote for such intrusive missions. That
initially prompted the civilian hawks in Washington to advocate US unilat-
eral intervention. Meanwhile, a risk-averse US military leadership was wary
about intervention and outright opposed to proceeding unilaterally. Focusing
on the Haiti and Kosovo cases is therefore useful for illustrating and prob-
ing the plausibility of the argument that the military leaders constitute the
ultimate bulwark against US unilateral humanitarian intervention. Other post-
Cold War humanitarian interventions, such as Somalia in 1992 and Liberia in
2003, enjoyed significant international support a priori. Those were (at least
initially) limited missions aimed at facilitating the delivery of emergency hu-
manitarian assistance; securing IO approval was not difficult; and no senior
US official opposed a multilateral course of action. Consequently, in those
cases, the military’s role in multilateralizing US policy was probably less
central.61
Investigating US decision making on Haiti and Kosovo is also useful for
other reasons. The Haiti and Kosovo interventions were backed by different
61 On Somalia, see Nora Bensahel, “Humanitarian Relief and Nation Building in Somalia,” in The
United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (Washington, DC: US Institute
of Peace, 2003), 21–56; Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 184–85. On Liberia, see Richard Stevenson and Christo-
pher Marquis, “Bush Team Faces Widespread Pressure to Act on Liberia,” New York Times, 23 July 2003;
more generally, Alan J. Kuperman, “A small intervention: Lessons from Liberia 2003,” in Naval Peacekeep-
ing and Humanitarian Operations: Stability from the Sea, ed. James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New
York: Routledge, 2008), chap. 11.
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IOs—the United Nations and NATO, respectively—and therefore studying
these two cases might elucidate the relative merits of securing approval
from one versus the other. Furthermore, the Haiti and Kosovo interventions
occurred long enough ago that several former policymakers are now willing
to speak candidly about their motivations and concerns at the time. As a
result, the US decision-making process can be reconstructed with a higher
degree of confidence than would be possible for more recent interventions.
The argument developed in previous pages would be strongly corrob-
orated if key policymakers who were initially willing to bypass relevant IOs
acknowledged that the military’s veto threat was, indeed, what persuaded
them to seek UN or NATO approval. Policymakers, however, tend to down-
play the importance of bureaucratic compromises forced upon them by oth-
ers, presumably because they dislike giving credit to their opponents and
instead prefer to emphasize their own leadership and initiative. As research
by Etel Solingen shows, in the field of national security, “leaders and state
officials have incentives to justify decisions in terms of ‘reasons of state’ [or]
by appealing to norms [rather] than by wielding parochial political consid-
erations.”62 It follows that the role of bureaucratic bargaining in this field
is hard to substantiate, and as a result “even partial substantiation . . . gains
particular significance.”63
Below I present direct evidence from interviews in which several former
policymakers acknowledge the importance of securing multilateral backing
for mollifying a reluctant military leadership. But the motives that led to the
adoption of particular policies can also be established indirectly by carefully
tracing the decision-making process. If hawkish civilian policymakers were
initially willing to bypass the UNSC and NAC, but the risk-averse generals
were able to block US intervention until the civilian leadership secured IO
approval as well as more specific burden-sharing commitments, it can be
inferred that the generals played an important role in multilateralizing US
policy. Information gathered from interviews is not always reliable, as per-
sonal memories may be distorted by hindsight. However, if interviewees
from different agencies and departments offer similar conclusions and their
analyses are compatible with the written record, confidence in the findings
increases. For data triangulation, I also rely on declassified documents, some
of which have been released pursuant to a Mandatory Declassification Re-
view that I requested from US authorities.64
62 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007), 13, 16.
63 Ibid., 5.
64 Documents released pursuant to Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request 2009–0983–M,
submitted by author, now available at http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collections/show/36/.
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Haiti, 1993–94
In September 1994, twenty thousand US troops intervened in Haiti to put an
end to systematic human rights violations and restore to office Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, the country’s democratically elected president who had been ousted
in a military coup three years earlier. During the summer preceding the in-
tervention, the United States made an all-out effort to secure UN approval for
forcibly restoring Aristide to office. Former president Bill Clinton recalls that
“it took months to build support . . . in our hemisphere [and] even longer
to win the improbable 12–0 mandate from the UN Security Council.”65 To
secure UN approval, the United States accepted a logrolling bargain with
Russia: in exchange for Moscow’s cooperation at the Security Council on
Haiti, Washington agreed to support a Security Council mandate for Rus-
sian occupation forces in Georgia.66 Furthermore, the United States applied
significant pressure on its hesitant international partners, especially in the
Western Hemisphere: recently declassified documents show that Washing-
ton explicitly linked US economic assistance in the hemisphere to support
for its policy on Haiti.67 Why were US leaders willing to delay military action
and resort to these costly measures to secure UN approval?
THE INTERVENTIONISTS’ INITIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Soon after the Clinton administration took office in early 1993, national se-
curity adviser Anthony “Tony” Lake began calling for military intervention in
Haiti. As Lawrence Pezzullo, then the US special envoy for Haiti, remembers,
“The first meeting I had with Tony Lake at his office [in March 1993], he said
that we might have to use military force.”68 Over the next year, Lake and his
deputies, Samuel Berger and Nancy Soderberg, as well as Lawrence Rossin,
the Haiti policy director on the NSC staff, became increasingly convinced
65 Quoted in Taylor Branch, The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2009), 185–86. Brazil and China abstained on the Security Council vote, and the
representative of Rwanda, a country ravaged by genocide at the time, was not present, hence the 12–0
outcome. See Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, 109–10.
66 James Boone, “US and Russia broker Haiti invasion deal,” The Times, 1 August 1994. See also
Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax, 2003), 158; Malone, Decision-
Making in the UN Security Council, 107.
67 National Security Council, “Summary of Conclusions of Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee,” 10
May 1994 (document released pursuant to MDR request 2009–0983–M, submitted by author). See also
Latin American Intelligence Service, “Another two-step from Washington,” Latin American Weekly Report,
23 June 1994.
68 Lawrence Pezzullo (US special envoy to Haiti, 1993–94), interview by author, 24 June 2009. See
also Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth (New York: Wiley, 2005), 46. On the Haiti intervention
more generally, see Robert Pastor, “The Delicate Balance between Coercion and Diplomacy: The Case of
Haiti, 1994,” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy; Sarah E. Kreps, “The 1994 Haiti Intervention:
A Unilateral Operation in Multilateral Clothes,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 3 (2007): 449–74.
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that no meaningful progress would be possible in Haiti without military
intervention.69
The administration’s leading interventionists on the NSC staff were at
first not especially concerned about the possibility of an open-ended US
troop deployment. As Rossin acknowledges, “The idea that we would some-
how get stuck there and therefore needed to have an exit strategy before we
got in was not something that was part of the discussion until pretty late in
the day.”70 Focusing on the payoffs of military action and anticipating a lim-
ited operational commitment, the interventionists did not view international
burden sharing, as facilitated by IO approval, as particularly advantageous,
let alone essential. “Dealing with Lake and Berger,” Rossin explains, “I don’t
remember that they agonized over whether or not there was international
approval for this intervention.”71
Lake confirms that initially he did not view UN approval as essential.
He believed that securing UN approval would be difficult, given widespread
Latin American opposition to US intervention in the hemisphere.72 The na-
tional security adviser doubted that the effort would be worthwhile. Once
obtained, a UNSC mandate would hardly help to increase US domestic sup-
port for intervention because “with a lot of the Congress, having a UN cover
is not a good thing,” and the burden sharing that it could facilitate would
be only marginally beneficial because “Haiti is not Vietnam.”73 The civil-
ian interventionists anticipated that regardless of UN approval, following
the deployment of US troops, Congress and the American public would rally
around the flag and support the president. A confidential note written in May
1994 by Dante Caputo, the UN special representative for Haiti, and based
on conversations with senior US officials, highlights that key policymakers
in Washington expected “that the current opposition of public opinion to an
armed intervention will change radically, once it will have taken place.”74
By the spring of 1994 senior officials at the State Department increasingly
joined the NSC staff in advocating US military intervention.75 Secretary of
State, Warren Christopher, a World War II veteran, was personally reluctant
69 Ann Devroy and Jeffrey Smith, “Debate Over Risks Split Administration,” Washington Post, 25
September 1994.
70 Lawrence Rossin, (Haiti policy director, NSC staff, 1993–94), interview by author, 25 July 2009;
confirmed by Pezzullo, interview.
71 Rossin, interview.
72 He says he didn’t “expect them [i.e., the Latin Americans], practically under any circumstances, to
be in favor of an American intervention in the hemisphere, because of history.” Anthony D. Lake (US
national security adviser, 1993–97), interview by author, 26 June 2009.
73 Lake, interview.
74 Confidential note to the UN secretary-general from special representative of the secretary-general
Dante Caputo, 23 May 1994 (leaked and published in the Congressional Record, 29 September 1994). On
the expectation of a rally-round-the-flag effect, see also R.W. Apple Jr., “Showdown in Haiti: Preaching
to Skeptics,” New York Times, 16 September 1994.
75 Pezzullo, interview. See also Branch, Clinton Tapes, 188.
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but mostly stayed on the sidelines of the debate. Meanwhile Strobe Talbott,
who became deputy secretary of state in February 1994 and whose influence
was magnified by his personal friendship with President Clinton, supported
a force-based strategy. Madeleine Albright, then the US ambassador to the
United Nations, was an avowed hawk on Haiti, as was James Dobbins, who
became the State Department’s new Haiti policy coordinator in April.76 The
most hawkish State Department officials at first explicitly opposed the idea of
seeking a UN mandate. Dobbins, in particular, insisted that the United States
should not even try, because the effort would be exceedingly costly, time
consuming, and unlikely to succeed.77 Talbott was not opposed to seeking
UN approval in principle, but he, too, downplayed its likely payoffs; similar
to Lake, he doubted that a Security Council mandate would help increase
US domestic support for intervention, “because a lot of our domestic critics
weren’t very crazy about the UN, either.”78
MILITARY SKEPTICISM AND THE LESSONS OF SOMALIA
If President Clinton nevertheless remained unwilling to authorize US inter-
vention until the late summer of 1994, when UN approval and a credible exit
strategy had become available, that appears to have been to a significant de-
gree the result of strong intramural resistance from the Pentagon and the US
military establishment in particular. America’s top-level generals and admirals
disputed that important US national interests were at stake in Haiti; they were
skeptical about using force to restore democracy and protect human rights;
and they persistently warned that the civilian interventionists’ expectation of
a short in-and-out mission was unrealistic.79 Admiral William Owens, the JCS
vice chairman at the time, recalls attending several NSC meetings in which,
as he puts it, “the idealism of senior administration officials was running
rampant” and the military was cautioning against the view that “everything
was going to be rosy after [the United States] had gotten in and reestablished
the leader.”80
The military’s concerns about intervening in Haiti were exacerbated fol-
lowing the killing of eighteen Army Rangers deployed on a humanitarian
mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993.81 The Somalia inter-
vention had initially been conceived as a short in-and-out mission in late
76 Devroy and Smith, “Debate Over Risks Split Administration.” See also Albright, Madam Secretary,
157.
77 James Dobbins (special Haiti coordinator, US Department of State, 1994–95), interview by author,
9 July 2009.
78 Strobe Talbott (deputy US secretary of state, 1994–2001), interview by author, 9 July 2009.
79 John Christiansen (Haiti task group director, US Department of Defense, 1993–97), interview by
author, 15 July 2009. See also Albright, Madam Secretary, 157; David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace:
Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Touchstone 2001), 269–79.
80 Adm. William Owens (JCS vice chairman, 1994–96), interview by author, 27 January 2011.
81 Avant, “Reluctant Warriors,” 72–73; Albright, Madam Secretary, 156–57.
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1992: American forces would limit themselves to opening up the food sup-
ply routes blocked by rebel militias, while longer-term nation building would
be left to a UN mission with only minimal US participation.82 However, in
1993 the Somalia intervention ended in a quagmire after President Clinton,
far from withdrawing American troops, acquiesced to a request from the UN
secretary-general to change the mission to peace enforcement. Escalating
clashes with Somali militias culminated in the 3 October killing, prompt-
ing Congress to enforce a withdrawal of all American troops by cutting off
funding.83
America’s military leadership learned several lessons from the Somalia
experience. First, US objectives in humanitarian operations have to be lim-
ited and must be clearly defined from the outset. Second, before deploying
American troops in humanitarian missions overseas, US policymakers need
to obtain a firm commitment from the UN or regional IOs as well as from
potential troop contributors that there will be a relatively quick handoff to
a follow-on multilateral mission led by other countries. Finally, the transi-
tion to follow-on multilateral missions has to be planned in much greater
detail. Significantly, however, although civilian administration officials used
the UN as a scapegoat for the failure in Somalia, the US military blamed the
haphazard strategy of the civilian leadership in Washington and remained
convinced that the UN-handoff idea could represent a useful model for the
future.84
As a result, when President Clinton requested the development of con-
tingency plans for US intervention in Haiti in late 1993, the Joint Staff, under
the coordination of Lieutenant-General Wesley Clark, then the J-5 director
for strategic plans and policy, developed a matrix of specific tasks to be
accomplished by American forces before longer-term stabilization could be
handed off to the United Nations.85 The US Atlantic Command (USACOM)
delivered a draft operations plan (code named OPLAN 2370) by February
1994. The plan envisaged a twenty-four day US military operation in Haiti,
82 Adm. David Jeremiah (JCS vice chairman, 1990–93), interview by author, 28 January 2011. For
a useful discussion, see also Herman J. Cohen, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, 1989–93,
Intervening in Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 210–14.
83 Bensahel, “Humanitarian Relief,” 35–45. See also Grimmett, “Congressional Use of Funding
Cutoffs,” 3.
84 Gen. Walter Kross (Joint Staff director, 1994–96); Adm. Frank L. Bowman (director for political-
military affairs, Joint Staff, 1992–94); Col. William J. Flavin (assistant to deputy chief of operations, Army
Staff, 1992–94, and director of doctrine, concepts, education, and training, US Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, 1999–2013), interviews by author, 18 January, 11 February, and 27 April
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85 Flavin, interview. See also John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military
Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), esp. 62–66.
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after which longer-term stabilization tasks would be handed off to a multilat-
eral (preferably UN) force.86 The final operations plan approved by the Joint
Staff on 20 May 1994 explicitly foresaw that after a forced entry by the 82nd
Airborne Division and a short US-led stabilization effort, “US forces will be
replaced as UNMIH [UN Mission in Haiti] forces arrive.”87
MOLLIFYING A RELUCTANT MILITARY LEADERSHIP
According to Frank Wisner, who at the time was undersecretary of defense
for policy, there was “practically a doctrinal assumption” among the mili-
tary leadership that the mission in Haiti had to be internationalized from
the beginning.88 Admiral Owens says that, although the Joint Chiefs did not
explicitly request UN approval, they insisted that following the initial US
intervention, “there needed to be a United Nations force that would come
in and be committed, with the size and texture to do this for the long term,
because it wasn’t going to get fixed in the short term.”89 Military planners
on the Joint Staff were more explicit in recommending that the administra-
tion secure UN approval ahead of intervention: whenever they briefed the
president and NSC, remembers General Walter Kross, who directed the Joint
Staff at the time, “the UN sanction upfront would certainly be in the rec-
ommended option . . . [because] it was really a central element of our exit
strategy.”90
Process tracing of the policy’s development in the spring and summer
of 1994 further clarifies the military’s role. During an NSC principals’ meeting
on 7 May, Lake suggested that it would be “useful” to take a decision on
the shift toward a force-based strategy. Thereupon, JCS chairman General
John Shalikashvili presented the latest US invasion plan, but he insisted
that the military, on its own, could not “deliver . . . a plan on how to get
out.”91 In previous days, high-ranking military officers had emphasized their
concerns about the risk of an open-ended US commitment in interviews
with the press, publicly worrying about the absence of UN approval.92 That
was a clear signal that the senior officers would remain opposed, until the
administration offered them credible assurances about multilateral burden
86 Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”:
A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 48–49.
87 CINCUSACOM message 131358Z, “Operation Maintain Democracy,” 20 May 1994 (on file with
author). See also Ronald H. Cole, “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998–99): 63.
88 Frank Wisner (undersecretary of defense for policy, 1993–94), interview by author, 16 July 2009.
89 Owens, interview; confirmed by Christiansen, interview.
90 Kross, interview.
91 Quoted in Soderberg, Superpower Myth, 49.
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sharing and the availability of an exit strategy—preferably by securing a
UN mandate that also foresaw the establishment of a follow-on UN mission
within a clearly defined timeframe.93
By June 1994 senior military planners at USACOM publicly announced
that they “assumed” any military intervention in Haiti would be conducted
under a UN mandate.94 Also in June, John Deutch, the deputy secretary of
defense, invited Strobe Talbott, his equal in rank from the State Department,
and James Steinberg, the State Department’s head of policy planning, to
several informal conversations with the JCS and other high-ranking military
officers. Over the following weeks, Talbott in particular, who had for several
months been a staunch advocate of intervention, became much more aware
of what the military planners viewed as the operation’s principal risks.95
Lake himself reluctantly acknowledges that it was important to mollify the
uniformed leaders and address their principal concerns in order to build up
intra-administration support for intervention: “Defining a mission that had an
end point was something that it was certainly necessary to work on vis-a`-vis
the Pentagon.”96
From the late spring of 1994 onward, remembers Nancy Soderberg,
who then worked under Lake on the NSC staff, the interventionists’ strategy
to mollify the military and their civilian allies at the Pentagon aimed to
“build the case that the intervention was going to be limited and targeted.”97
The centerpiece of this strategy involved securing UNSC approval for the
use of force, combined with a UN commitment to establish a follow-on
peacekeeping mission led by other countries. SC Resolution 940, adopted
on 31 July 1994 did precisely that: it authorized the use of force in Haiti and
committed the Security Council to establishing a follow-on UN mission that
would “assume the full range of its functions” as soon as basic security had
been restored.
Talbott has little doubt that the principal reason why the State Depart-
ment worked hard to obtain a UNSC mandate explicitly foreseeing such a
follow-on mission was to reassure the military leaders: “Our principal reason
for wanting to do a handoff to the UN as quickly as possible was that our mil-
itary really wanted it. It really had to do with [JCS chairman] Shalikashvili.”98
93 John Christiansen, who at the time chaired the Pentagon’s Haiti task group, recalls how the military
worried that it would be exceedingly difficult “to get the UN eventually to come in” without an advance
UN mandate that also contained explicit guarantees about the establishment of a follow-on UN force:
“That was absolutely critical. The Pentagon would have strenuously objected to going into Haiti without
having the commitment of a follow-on [UN] force.” Christiansen, interview.
94 Ann Devroy and Barton Gellmann, “Exodus From Haiti Strains US Policy: Military Intervention
Considered,” Washington Post, 2 July 1994.
95 Devroy and Smith, “Debate Over Risks Split Administration.”
96 Lake, interview.
97 Nancy Soderberg (deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs 1993–96), interview
by author, 29 July 2009.
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Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral Intervention 275
Morton Halperin, another advocate of intervention who played an important
role in shaping US policy toward Haiti as a senior member of the NSC staff,
confirms that “the deal that was brokered with the UN was very much to
get the military to go in, [because] the generals were concerned about how
quickly they could get out.”99
Unnamed senior administration officials subsequently confirmed to the
Washington Post that “he [Clinton] waited until September to satisfy Pentagon
reservations.”100 Obtaining a Security Council mandate that explicitly foresaw
a follow-on UN mission was almost certainly necessary but may not have
been sufficient to mollify the military. Other elements of the administration’s
multi-pronged strategy to reassure the JCS included a CIA-led covert opera-
tion in the late summer of 1994 aimed at promoting an internal army coup in
Haiti,101 systematic efforts to bribe the Haitian de facto leaders into exile by
offering them financial incentives,102 and a last-ditch diplomatic effort led by
former US president Jimmy Carter. Ultimately, Carter, wielding the credible
threat of a US invasion, persuaded the Haitian rulers to step down volun-
tarily and consent to the peaceful deployment of American troops.103 By
late March 1995, with Aristide restored to the presidency and basic stability
reestablished, the United States was able to hand off peacekeeping respon-
sibilities to a six-thousand-strong UN mission, which, according to plan, was
composed of a majority of non-US troops. One year later, command of the
peacekeeping force was turned over to Canada and Washington withdrew
all but a handful of US troops.104
Kosovo, 1998–99
On 24 March 1999, the United States and thirteen other NATO members
launched a coercive air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
aimed at stopping the systematic oppression and mass expulsion of the
Kosovar Albanian population. Forging a NATO consensus on the use of
force required months of intense transatlantic negotiations. That undermined
Washington’s coercive leverage while the humanitarian situation in Kosovo
continued to deteriorate. Furthermore, even after the NAC approved the use
of force and air strikes began, persistent allied disagreements over strategy
99 Morton Halperin (senior director for democracy on the NSC staff, 1994–96), interview by author,
10 March 2010.
100 Quoted in Devroy and Smith, “Debate Over Risks Split Administration.”
101 Doyle McManus and Robin Wright, “Covert Action Fails to Oust Haiti’s Rulers,” Los Angeles Times,
16 September 1994.
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August 1994.
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and tactics made for an ineffective use of airpower.105 Yet without NATO’s
approval, “it is pretty clear that it [the humanitarian intervention] would not
have happened,” explains Walter Slocombe, the undersecretary of defense
for policy at the time.106
DEBATING US UNILATERAL STRIKES, APRIL–MAY 1998
In the spring of 1998, when the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Kosovo became a matter of growing international concern, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright emerged as the leading advocate of military intervention
within the US executive branch. As one of her former aides recalls, “Albright
believed very early on that the lessons of Bosnia were that [Yugoslav pres-
ident Slobodan] Milosevic would respond only to the use of force.”107 Dur-
ing the first half of 1998, most of Washington’s European allies—including
France, Italy, and Germany—were reluctant to countenance military action
to enforce ethnic minority rights.108 Consequently, on 23 April 1998, Albright
and Robert Gelbard, the State Department’s hawkish Balkans envoy, made
the case for US unilateral strikes to national security adviser Samuel Berger
and his deputy, Donald Kerrick.109
Albright and Gelbard’s specific proposal was that the United States give
Milosevic an ultimatum of between three and five days to remove most of
his security forces from Kosovo, and, in case of noncompliance, Washington
should “use Tomahawk missiles and in the middle of the night destroy the
[Yugoslav] ministry of defense and the ministry of interior.”110 Asked about
the role of NATO and the European allies, Gelbard concedes, “I am not
even sure we ever thought about the other allies at the time.”111 Berger,
however, summarily rejected the proposal. “What if that doesn’t work?” he
retorted. “Do you continue bombing?”112 The president himself, Albright
recalls, subsequently made it “very clear that . . . we had to work with the
allies, that we weren’t going to do this unilaterally.”113
105 For useful discussions, see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War
to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 31–108; Alex Bellamy, Kosovo and
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Berger’s and the president’s skepticism about unilateral airstrikes ap-
pears to have been influenced to a considerable degree by their frequent in-
teractions with representatives of the JCS. “We used to talk to Sandy [Berger]
a lot,” recalls General David Weisman, who at the time played a key liaison
role between military and civilian leaders as the deputy head of strategic
planning on the Joint Staff. “Bob Gelbard,” he adds, “had no idea about how
to deploy military force.”114
THE MILITARY’S CONCERNS
The Joint Chiefs, led by General Henry “Hugh” Shelton and his deputy,
General Joseph Ralston, doubted that airpower alone could persuade Milo-
sevic to accede to Washington’s demands, and they feared it might put the
United States on a slippery slope toward a full-scale ground invasion. “Peo-
ple would say, ‘OK just the threat of airstrikes will work,’” General Ralston
recalls. “Well, then we’d ask, what if it doesn’t? ‘OK,’ they replied, ‘then if
you drop one or two bombs, it will solve the problem.’ Well, we continued,
what if it doesn’t? Ultimately, you’d have to be prepared to introduce ground
forces, or do whatever was needed.”115
The JCS further worried that even if airpower persuaded Milosevic to
capitulate, ultimate success in Kosovo would require an open-ended in-
ternational military commitment to maintain security for the long term.116
Colonel Gregory Kaufmann, then a senior official on the Pentagon’s Balkans
task force, explains that, from early on, the military planners “were very
much looking at SFOR [i.e., the international stabilization force in Bosnia].
Our thought was that we would have to deploy a similar kind of force
in Kosovo.”117 In the intramural debates, the uniformed leaders expressed
concerns that, with the Bosnia mission still ongoing, Congress might not sup-
port another large-scale and protracted US troop deployment to the Balkans,
which made it imperative in their eyes that the stabilization burden in Kosovo
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military representative, NATO Military Committee, October 1998–June 2001), interview by author, 16
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115 Gen. Joseph Ralston (JCS vice chairman, 1996–2000), interview by author, 17 March 2009. See
also Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict (New York: Public
Affairs, 2001), 137, 165; Halberstam, War in Time of Peace, 377, 411–16.
116 The only high-ranking military officer who sided with the civilian hawks on this occasion and at
first downplayed the likely operational costs was Gen. Wesley Clark, the commander of US and allied
troops in Europe. However, the JCS became very irritated at Clark’s behavior, and for most of 1998, they
quite effectively curtailed Clark’s access to the president and the NSC. See Halberstam, War in Time of
Peace, 388, 396; Clark, Waging Modern War, 109, 127.
117 Col. Gregory Kaufmann (chief of staff, 1997–98, and director, 1999–2000, Balkans task force,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1999–2000), interview by author, 10 March 2010. See also Clark,
Waging Modern War, 137, 165, 307.
278 S. Recchia
be shifted as much as possible to the European allies.118 As General Ralston
recalls, “The Congress was pretty skeptical about involvement in the Balkans
and in Kosovo. The military didn’t want to find themselves in a situation
where we get started in this and then suddenly the Congress says, ‘Well,
wait a minute, we’re not going to support that.’ Because then you don’t have
a way to succeed.”119 Former advocates of intervention from the State Depart-
ment concede that, at first, they didn’t think a large-scale troop deployment
would be needed to maintain stability in Kosovo; consequently, compared
to their Pentagon colleagues, they were less concerned about congressional
support.120
On Kosovo, the generals for the most part expressed their concerns
privately in the intramural debates, but they clearly signaled to the civilian
leadership that they might speak out in public unless their views were taken
seriously.121 Berger and Clinton understood that overt opposition from the
military could have disastrous implications in terms of public and congres-
sional support for the administration’s Kosovo policy.122 The civilian advo-
cates of intervention therefore had to mollify the military by answering its
concerns. That required, first of all, that the civilian interventionists more sys-
tematically consider the goals, likely implications, and potential downsides
of armed intervention. James Rubin, one of Albright’s closest collaborators at
the time, acknowledges that the interventionists at first “didn’t want to spend
a lot of time thinking about what would happen if it didn’t work—that’s
true.”123 Leon Fuerth, then a senior NSC staffer and influential advocate of US
intervention in the Balkans, recognizes the generals’ leverage: “You couldn’t
make it sail unless you could convince the US military that you knew why
you were getting into this war,” he explains, “and consequently you could
define the circumstances under which you would get out.”124
MOLLIFYING THE GENERALS
As the humanitarian hawks at the State Department stepped up their ad-
vocacy of intervention from the summer of 1998 onward, the Joint Chiefs
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demanded assurances that following US-led airstrikes, Washington’s Euro-
pean allies would take the lead on Kosovo’s long-term stabilization. “The US
military was very anxious that we not have the main burden—in fact, we
wanted to have as little of the burden as we could possibly have,” recalls a
former senior Pentagon official.125 In the fall of 1998, Secretary of Defense
William Cohen publicly backed the JCS and set a red line by demanding that
any stabilization force for Kosovo should be “largely, if not wholly, European
in nature, given [that US forces] will be carrying the bulk of the load” in any
preceding air campaign.126
In top-level policy meetings, the military leaders did not explicitly de-
mand a NATO endorsement for the use of force but nevertheless made
their preference in this regard clearly known. Extrapolating from the previ-
ous experience in Bosnia, the Joint Chiefs expected that securing NATO’s
approval for airstrikes and involving the alliance in all aspects of policy
planning and implementation would help commit NATO and its principal
member states to sustained burden sharing. “If there was going to be a
military solution, we wanted to make sure that the allies were on board,”
recalls General Weisman, the deputy head of strategic planning on the Joint
Staff. “We needed the NATO endorsement, and NATO had to take the
lead, so that everybody would be involved, not only with the operation,
but also with the peace afterwards—in fact, that was the most important
part.”127
Albright recalls that, given the Pentagon’s resistance to armed interven-
tion, “to forge a consensus within my own government [was] not an easy
task.”128 The secretary of state and her fellow civilian interventionists thus
gradually came to realize that obtaining NATO’s endorsement, as well as
more specific burden-sharing commitments from the European allies, of-
fered the best prospect of mollifying the reluctant generals. As Albright’s
former executive assistant explains, “to the extent that the secretary could
reject the Pentagon’s argument” about the risks and likely costs of interven-
tion, “that certainly helped us in the interagency debate.”129 Morton Halperin,
the State Department’s director of policy planning at the time, is more ex-
plicit: “We wanted this as a shared burden, and we wanted the US forces
to get out as quickly as possible. Getting NATO on board and knowing that
NATO forces were going to go in later made it easier to sell the policy to the US
government—and particularly to the Joint Chiefs.”130
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For some time in 1998, the State Department also considered the pos-
sibility of seeking approval for the use of force from the UNSC, based on
the expectation that a Security Council mandate would make it easier to
garner European support.131 However, by mid-July 1998 the administration
concluded that given Russia’s recalcitrance, “efforts to achieve a United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII would be counterpro-
ductive.”132 During subsequent months, Washington focused its multilateral
diplomatic efforts almost exclusively on the Atlantic alliance. In late August
1998 the NSC Deputies Committee, in which senior officials below cabinet
rank typically work out the details of US national security policy, concluded
that “the first round of air strikes should not be launched without agreement
in principle on a substantial follow-on package. With this in mind, [it was
decided that] Secretaries Albright and Cohen . . . will contact their [NATO]
counterparts to . . . build consensus for substantial air operations.”133
It took another several months, until 23 January 1999, for the military
leaders to consent to a strategy based on airstrikes, contingent on NATO’s fi-
nal approval.134 By then, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Kosovo
had strengthened NATO’s resolve, and a meeting of the Balkans Contact
Group, a transatlantic diplomatic forum, on 22 January persuaded the JCS
that the Western Europeans could indeed be relied upon to contribute the
majority of stabilization troops.135 The NAC then endorsed the use of air-
power on 30 January.136 After the failure of a last-ditch diplomatic effort in
Rambouillet, France, NATO commenced its air campaign on 24 March.137
As the political scientist Michael Beckley puts it, the support of America’s
principal military alliance “encouraged US military action by making it less
costly.”138 Soon after Milosevic yielded to NATO’s demands in early June,
Washington’s European allies then publicly reconfirmed their willingness
to shoulder most of the postwar burden.139 Washington’s pursuit of a con-
sistently multilateral approach over Kosovo bore the intended fruits: over
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the following years, the United States never contributed more than sixteen
percent of troops to the international stabilization force.140
CONCLUSION: ARE THE GENERALS “OUT OF CONTROL”?
Civilian policymakers debating the use of force differ significantly in their
attitude toward multilateralism depending on their sense of urgency, their
strategic assessment, and their ideological background. Consequently, sim-
ply looking at policymakers’ attitudes does not allow us to account for a
strikingly consistent pattern: since the end of the Cold War, US humanitarian
military interventions have either been carried out multilaterally, with IO ap-
proval, or they have not been carried out at all. This article has argued that
whatever else may motivate civilian policymakers to seek UN or NATO ap-
proval for humanitarian interventions, such approval is necessary to mollify
US military leaders and overcome their veto. Evidence that the generals, as
political realists, value international burden sharing and can steer US policy
on humanitarian intervention toward the UNSC or NAC buttresses claims
that support for multilateralism need not necessarily flow from lofty inter-
nationalist beliefs but may just as well result from pragmatic concerns with
capability aggregation and limited liability in foreign affairs.141
The argument developed in this article can also illuminate instances of
US nonintervention. When civilian policymakers advocate the use of force
for humanitarian purposes, but they are unable to secure IO approval and
the situation does not clearly threaten US national security, senior uniformed
leaders can be expected to veto the use of American force. Two examples
may help to illustrate this. In 2005 and 2006 civilian policymakers advocated
the deployment of American combat troops on a humanitarian mission to
Darfur, and President George W. Bush was reportedly sympathetic to the
idea. Members of the JCS, however, were adamantly opposed: they estimated
that the mission would require up to 120,000 US troops and emphasized the
risk of a costly, open-ended commitment.142 Seeking to address some of
the military’s concerns, the president, together with Secretary of State, Con-
doleezza Rice, advanced the idea of “NATO stewardship” for Darfur.143 But
the administration was unable to obtain NATO’s support, and the generals’
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objections eventually persuaded the civilian leadership that direct US military
intervention without solid multilateral backing was unfeasible.144
The generals’ opposition also played a key role in keeping the United
States on a path of nonintervention as a genocide unfolded in Rwanda in
the spring of 1994. In late April 1994, reacting to reports of spiraling ethnic
violence, midlevel officials from the NSC staff and the State Department
floated the possibility of a US humanitarian intervention in Rwanda.145 Yet
declassified documents show that their uniformed counterparts on the Joint
Staff were “in stiff opposition,” emphasizing the risks of intervention and
“strongly object[ing] to signing up for open-ended missions that could lead
to . . . troops being in life-threatening situations.”146 Given the highly volatile
situation on the ground and the fact that there was little enthusiasm among
other members of the UNSC for authorizing a peace-enforcement operation
and contributing troops, no high-ranking US official was willing to challenge
the military and push for intervention.147 Only in late July 1994, after the
ethnic violence in Rwanda had abated, did the JCS consent to the deployment
of American troops to the region as part of a UN-sponsored relief effort,
having obtained credible assurances that a follow-on multilateral mission
would soon take over.148
In several ways, the senior military officers appear to embody a long-
standing concern of American political realism with restraining the interven-
tionist impulses of liberal US civilian elites.149 It bears emphasizing, however,
that the military can tilt the bureaucratic balance of power toward noninter-
vention and thus veto the use of force only as long as the civilian leadership
is divided and the president remains uncommitted. If President Clinton and
most of his civilian advisers had been determined to intervene in Rwanda,
the military would almost certainly have followed civilian orders. The mil-
itary leaders are unlikely to oppose publicly a particular intervention after
the president takes a final decision to intervene.150 The concerns of some
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analysts that the US military leaders may be “out of control” are therefore
exaggerated.151 Although the US military has significant leverage over poli-
cymaking on the use of force, there is no serious threat to the principle of
civilian control in the United States. Indeed, the military’s leverage can be
seen as aligning with the American Founding Fathers’ intent to check and
balance political power, thus fostering deeper deliberation and making it
more difficult for controversial use-of-force policies to go forward without
broad-based domestic support.
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